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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article summarizes the major developments in legal ethics in
Georgia between June 1, 2005 and May 31, 2006. The Article covers
discipline of lawyers, ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney fees and
liens, contempt, disqualification, malpractice (and other claims against
lawyers), judicial ethics, unauthorized practice of law, and one case on
attorney authority.
II.

DISCIPLINE

Disbarments and Voluntary Surrenders
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred a number of lawyers (or, to the
same effect, accepted voluntary surrenders of their law licenses) for
familiar violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Several
lost their ability to practice law because of abandonment or neglect of
their clients.' Others met the same fate after felony convictions. 2

A.

William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
*
Director of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Walter F. George
School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of
Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. In re Guggenheim, 279 Ga. 749, 620 S.E.2d 824 (2005); In re Israel, 279 Ga. 720, 620
S.E.2d 390 (2005); In re Estrada, 279 Ga. 662, 619 S.E.2d 606 (2005); In re Vogel, 279 Ga.
719, 620 S.E.2d 389 (2005); In re Johnson, 279 Ga. 818, 621 S.E.2d 412 (2005); In re
Gardner, 279 Ga. 821, 621 S.E.2d 427 (2005); In re Green, 280 Ga. 52, 622 S.E.2d 332
(2005); In re Best, 280 Ga. 55, 622 S.E.2d 337 (2005); In re Perry, 280 Ga. 119, 622 S.E.2d
334 (2005). A list of the Georgia Supreme Court's Disciplinary Orders can be found in the
Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Report for Operational
Year 2005-2006, which is available online at http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/ogc/
OGCReport_05_06.pdf.
2. In re Fraser, 280 Ga. 163, 625 S.E.2d 756 (2006); In re Benveniste, 280 Ga. 305, 627
S.E.2d 3 (2006); In re Hickey, 280 Ga. 535, 630 S.E.2d 395 (2006); In re Rogers, 279 Ga.
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Financial transgressions ended the legal careers of several other
lawyers. In In re Lazarou,3 a real estate lawyer misrepresented that he
was an agent for a title insurance company. In another closing, the same
lawyer accepted money for title insurance, but instead of obtaining a
policy, the lawyer pocketed the money.4 In In re Rowan,5 a lawyer
forged a $70,000 settlement check and never forwarded any of the funds
to the client (the same lawyer had numerous other cases of neglect and
abandonment pending as well).' In a similar vein, in In re Peebles, an
attorney was disbarred for neglecting several matters and for converting
over $600,000 to his own use.' In In re Shelfer,9 an attorney was
disbarred after he overdrew his trust account and eventually stopped
responding to the State Bar's inquiries about the episode.' ° In In re
Ballard," an attorney used several hundred thousand dollars of client
money for his own benefit. 2 In In re Porges-Dodson,'3 an attorney
with a significant prior disciplinary record was disbarred after she
converted a number of
government benefit checks belonging to a man
1 4
who was incarcerated.
One bankruptcy lawyer found a more unusual way to get disbarred.
In In re Whatley," Whatley made an agreement with a nonlawyer (a
law school graduate who never passed the bar exam) to establish the law
firm of John C. Whatley & Associates. Under their agreement, the
nonlawyer was responsible for all areas of the practice except for
completing the filings with the bankruptcy court and appearing in court.
In return, Whatley would be paid a flat fee per case (which later became
a flat fee per month). According to Whatley, the nonlawyer eventually
closed the "firm" and took all the funds in the operating and other bank
accounts. These activities came to light when a client paid the firm

661, 619 S.E.2d 607 (2005); In re Lewis, 279 Ga. 555, 616 S.E.2d 451 (2005); In re Roberts,
279 Ga. 822, 621 S.E.2d 464 (2005); In re Kitchen, 279 Ga. 820, 621 S.E.2d 410 (2005); In
re Farrar, 279 Ga. 869, 621 S.E.2d 741 (2005); In re Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865, 621 S.E.2d
750 (2005).
3. 279 Ga. 664, 619 S.E.2d 632 (2005).
4. Id. at 664-65, 619 S.E.2d at 633.
5. 279 Ga. 659, 619 S.E.2d 675 (2005).
6. Id. at 660, 619 S.E.2d at 677.
7. 280 Ga. 229, 626 S.E.2d 488 (2006).
8. Id. at 229-32, 626 S.E.2d at 489-91.
9. 279 Ga. 552, 615 S.E.2d 511 (2005).
10. Id. at 552-53, 615 S.E.2d at 511-12.
11. 280 Ga. 504, 629 S.E.2d 809 (2005).
12. Id. at 504-06, 629 S.E.2d at 811-12.
13. 280 Ga. 433, 627 S.E.2d 545 (2006).
14. Id. at 433-34, 627 S.E.2d at 545-46.
15. 279 Ga. 867, 621 S.E.2d 732 (2005).
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money to bring a mortgage current, but the money was not used for that
purpose, and ultimately Whatley could not account for it. 6 Unsurprisingly, the Georgia Supreme Court disbarred Whatley for his violations
of Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (trust account), 7 5.3
(responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants), 8 5.4 (sharing fees
with a nonlawyer), 9 and 5.5 (assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law).2 °
One disbarment provoked a vigorous dissent from Justice Benham. In
In re Brown,2 Brown was a lawyer with some disciplinary history. He
had received a private reprimand in 1984, a public reprimand in 1998,
and a two-year suspension in 2000 for misuse of client funds that had
been received in a fiduciary capacity.22 In early 2005, Brown received

a memorandum of grievance after two checks were written out of his
trust account to pay his personal Mastercard bills, one for $25 and one
for $50. He responded to the grievance by stating that a secretary who
was not familiar with trust accounts had issued the checks.23 The
Notice of Discipline was for a Review Panel Reprimand, and Brown did
not contest it. 24 The State Bar of Georgia agreed with that discipline,
25

but the supreme court rejected the suggestion and disbarred Brown.
In his dissent, Justice Benham argued that this action was disproportionate to Brown's violation and suggested that other measures, such as
better training in law practice management, were more appropriate.26
Using language that he has used in other cases, Justice Benham
objected to the "professional death penalty" of disbarment in this case.
Three other lawyers lost their licenses during the survey period. One
was disbarred on a surprisingly unusual basis: incompetence. The bar
usually leaves questions of competence to actions for malpractice. In In
re Bast,2' however, the lawyer handled a real estate closing and paid

16.

Id. at 868, 621 S.E.2d at 733.

17.
18.
19.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2000).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2000).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2000).

20.
R. 5.5
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

In re Whatley, 279 Ga. at 869, 621 S.E.2d at 733; GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(2000).
280 Ga. 500, 629 S.E.2d 813 (2006).
Id. at 500, 629 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 502, 629 S.E.2d at 815 (Benham, J., dissenting).
280 Ga. at 500, 629 S.E.2d at 813.
Id., 629 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 500-01, 629 S.E.2d at 814 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 503, 629 S.E.2d at 815.
280 Ga. 240, 626 S.E.2d 506 (2006).
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out over $100,000 without the proper documentation to authorize the
payments. That lawyer voluntarily surrendered her law license.2 9
Two lawyers were disbarred for practicing law when they should not
have. In In re Brown,3" Brown took inactive status in 1997, but
represented a client in a drug condemnation case six years later.3 '
Another lawyer made the mistake of practicing law while his license was
suspended in In re Harvey,32 and the lawyer compounded that offense
by writing a bad check on his trust account, signing another lawyer's
name to pleadings, and neglecting a client's personal injury claim. 3
B.

Suspensions and Other Forms of Discipline

The Georgia Supreme Court imposed eleven suspensions during the
survey period. Several of these involved financial improprieties that
occurred under extenuating circumstances. In In re Rand,34 lawyer
Harry Rand was suspended for five years (on a petition for voluntary
discipline) after five separate instances of misuse of client money. 5
These transgressions occurred while Rand suffered from significant
mental problems and while he was dealing with the death of both of his
parents and the severe mental illness of his sister.36 Similarly, in In
7
re Glass,"
Glass was suspended for twelve months for taking $47,000
from his firm's operating account while he was experiencing mental
39
disabilities and chemical imbalances,3 8 and in In re Ballard,'
Ballard
received a two-year suspension for paying himself unearned fees at a
time of significant personal problems.4 °
Surprisingly, two lawyers received suspension rather than disbarment
for trust account violations even without showing such extenuating
circumstances. In In re Jones,4 ' Jones used over $43,000 from his trust
account to pay a promissory note for a business he operated with a
friend who was having personal problems.42
The supreme court

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 240-41, 626 S.E.2d at 506-07.
279 Ga. 817, 621 S.E.2d 464 (2005).
Id. at 817, 621 S.E.2d at 464.
279 Ga. 876, 621 S.E.2d 409 (2005).
Id. at 876, 621 S.E.2d at 409.
279 Ga. 555, 616 S.E.2d 452 (2005).
Id. at 555-56, 616 S.E.2d at 452-53.
Id. at 556, 616 S.E.2d at 453.
279 Ga. 666, 619 S.E.2d 677 (2005).
Id. at 666, 619 S.E.2d at 678.
279 Ga. 663, 619 S.E.2d 625 (2005).
Id. at 663, 619 S.E.2d at 626.
280 Ga. 302, 627 S.E.2d 24 (2006).
Id. at 302, 627 S.E.2d at 24.

2006]

LEGAL ETHICS

243

suspended Jones for twelve months, with six months of the suspension
retroactive.43 In In re Fraser,"'Fraser was suspended for nine months
for writing bad checks on his trust account totaling $218. 45 Contrast
the disbarment of Brown, where a member of Brown's staff unwittingly
paid $75 worth of credit cards bills from the trust account.46 Fraser,
however, was later disbarred as a result of a felony conviction.47
In In re Maxwell, 41 Maxwell received a six-month suspension for
litigation tactics that violated the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct.4 9 Maxwell was defending a sexual harassment matter, and
he knew that two of his client's employees had retained counsel in
connection with additional potential claims.5 ° Once he knew that these
employees had lawyers, Maxwell was forbidden from talking with them
about the matter without their lawyers' permission.5 1 Nevertheless,
Maxwell interviewed them without telling their lawyers, and he taped
the conversation. When opposing counsel learned about the tapes and
requested them, Maxwell delivered an edited version of the transcript
without revealing that it was edited.52 This course of action earned
Maxwell sanctions from the court where the case was pending and his
six-month suspension.53
Issues of diligence, communication, or both led to the suspension of
several lawyers. In In re Ellison,54 Ellison undertook to represent a
client in an auto accident (at a time when the lawyer had a disabling
illness), but he did little work on the matter and failed to communicate
with the client and to turn over her file when she fired him.5 He was
suspended for six months.5 " In In re Stewart,57 Stewart was suspended for two years because she agreed to file an appeal in a habeas action
but then neither communicated with the client nor responded to the
Bar's Notice of Discipline (even though she did secure review in the
Georgia Supreme Court of an application for a certificate of probable

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id., 627 S.E.2d at 24-25.
280 Ga. 56, 622 S.E.2d 337 (2005).
Id. at 56, 622 S.E.2d at 338.
In re Brown, 280 Ga. at 502, 629 S.E.2d at 815 (Benham, J., dissenting).
In re Fraser, 280 Ga. 163, 163, 625 S.E.2d 756, 757 (2006).
280 Ga. 304, 627 S.E.2d 16 (2006).
Id. at 305, 627 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 304, 627 S.E.2d at 17.
See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2(a) (2000).
In re Maxwell, 280 Ga. at 304-05, 627 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 305, 627 S.E.2d at 17.
280 Ga. 303, 627 S.E.2d 25 (2006).
Id. at 303, 627 S.E.2d at 26.
Id. at 304, 627 S.E.2d at 26.
280 Ga. 821, 631 S.E.2d 106 (2006).
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cause)."8 In In re Lenn, 9 Lenn failed to diligently pursue four matters
for clients in Florida, and the Florida Supreme Court suspended her for
ninety-one days.6" The Georgia Supreme Court imposed the identical
discipline as a matter of reciprocity.6
Finally, in In re Pilgrim,6
Pilgrim received a six-month suspension related to his handling of two
cases."3 In one case, he neglected to request a hearing in time to
preserve a client's claim, while in the other case he took no action except
eventually dismissing the action without the client's authority."
The most surprising suspension came in In re Paine.65 Paine pled
guilty in federal court to the felony of obstructing a federal audit, which
was examining the activities of a company in which Mr. Paine owned a
forty percent interest. The company, as it turns out, was engaged in
Medicare fraud, allegedly without the knowledge of Mr. Paine.66 A
felony conviction, as already discussed, is almost always a quick path to
disbarment. In this case, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
Mr. Paine posed no danger to the public but that he must remain on
suspension while he is on probation because of the likelihood that the
public would otherwise lose respect for the legal system.67
Seven lawyers received lesser discipline for a variety of offenses. In
In re Jessup,6" Jessup received a Letter of Formal Admonition as
reciprocal discipline for a "Public Censure" he received in Tennessee as
a result of charging a client an excessive fee. 9 In In re Meaney,7 °
Meaney received a private reprimand because he was also disciplined in
Tennessee for failing to file a suit before expiration of the statute of
limitations and for failing to communicate with his client.7
Two
lawyers received Review Panel Reprimands as a result of abandoning
clients.72 Another received the same punishment in In re Conti7 for

58. Id. at 821-22, 631 S.E.2d at 106-07.
59. 280 Ga. 371, 628 S.E.2d 107 (2006).
60. Id. at 371-72, 628 S.E.2d at 107-08.
61. Id. at 372, 628 S.E.2d at 108.
62. 279 Ga. 553, 615 S.E.2d 509 (2005).
63. Id. at 554, 615 S.E.2d at 509-10.
64. Id.
65. 280 Ga. 208, 625 S.E.2d 768 (2006).
66. Id. at 208-09, 625 S.E.2d at 768-69.
67. Id. at 210, 625 S.E.2d at 769.
68. No. S05Y2044 (Ga. Oct. 3,2005) (order administering Letter of Formal Admonition).
69. Id., slip op. at 1.
70. No. S05Y1877 (Ga. Oct. 24, 2005) (order administering private reprimand).
71. Id., slip op. at 1.
72. In re Boykin, No. S05Y1240 (Ga. June 30,2005) (order administering Review Panel
Reprimand); In re Denny, No. S05Y1270 (Ga. July 8, 2005) (order administering Review
Panel Reprimand).
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lying to a court about his client's availability to testify and for forging
the client's name to settlement documents (unbeknownst to the lawyer,
the client was dead).14 In In re Suggs, 75 a fourth Review Panel
Reprimand was administered to a lawyer who circumvented opposing
counsel to get a matter settled with his client's ex-husband and then
represented to an insurance company that he represented both of the
quarrelling ex-spouses.76 Finally, in In re Kitchen, 7 a lawyer received
a public reprimand for failing to return a client's documents after the
client fired him and for not responding to the Bar's Notice of Investigation. 7

III.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

As is usually the case, there were dozens of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel made during the survey year. The following
discussion notes the significant cases first from the Georgia Supreme
Court and then from the Georgia Court of Appeals.
Two of the Georgia Supreme Court cases involved deficient investigations by counsel. In Terry v. Jenkins,7 9 the supreme court affirmed a
judgment that a murder defendant had received ineffective assistance of
counsel."0 The defendant, Larry L. Jenkins, Jr., had been convicted of
the malice murders of two people who had been abducted from a coinoperated laundry (from which a large quantity of quarters was taken)
and whose white van had been stolen.81 Jenkins had two lawyers. One
was an experienced death penalty advocate, while the other was a local
attorney. The two lawyers apparently had a miscommunication about
the local attorney's role. The local attorney thought he was supposed to
provide some "local flavor" and some guidance about local people
involved in the case, but the lead lawyer thought that local counsel
would be investigating the defendant's alibi and the possibility that
The local counsel did little
someone else perpetrated the crime.
investigation. It turned out that more vigorous investigation would have
uncovered evidence that another man had been seen with rolls of

73. No. S05Y1170 (Ga. Oct 24, 2005) (order administering Review Panel Reprimand).
74. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
75. No. S06Y0644 (Ga. Feb. 13, 2006) (order administering Review Panel Reprimand).
76. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
77. No. S05Y1312 (Ga. Sept. 19,2005) (order administering public reprimand). Kitchen
was later disbarred as a result of a felony conviction. In re Kitchen, 279 Ga. 820, 621
S.E.2d 410 (2005).
78. In re Kitchen, No. S05Y1312, slip op. at 1-2.
79. 280 Ga. 341, 627 S.E.2d 7 (2006).
80. Id. at 341-42, 627 S.E.2d at 8.
81. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 8-9.
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quarters that night and that this same man had been seen in the
victims' van. The jury never heard this evidence because the local
lawyer did not find it. 8 2 The supreme court upheld the finding of the

habeas court that this failure to investigate was unreasonable and that
there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted
the defendant if they had heard this evidence.83 Therefore, the
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, and his conviction
was overturned."4
In Martin v. Barrett,5 the defendant was convicted of aggravated
child molestation and cruelty to children. His lawyers knew that he had
been hospitalized for treatment for mental illness, but they did nothing
to investigate his mental condition. 6 The expert who was finally
retained for the habeas corpus proceeding testified that the defendant
had suffered from a bipolar disorder that caused auditory and visual
hallucinations.8 7 The supreme court concluded that trial counsel was
deficient in not investigating the defendant's mental condition and that
the expert's testimony established that the failure to investigate harmed
the defendant.8 8 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the habeas
court's finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.8 9
In three cases, the Georgia Supreme Court found that counsel had
been, or might have been, ineffective in connection with guilty pleas. In
State v. Patel,90 the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of
sexual battery based upon his lawyer's representation that the client's
ability to practice medicine would not suffer any long-term consequences.
In fact, the doctor's plea automatically excluded him from Medicare,
Medicaid, and other federal programs for ten years, and he convinced the
habeas court that he would not have pled guilty if he had known that. 91
The court affirmed the habeas court's finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel.92

Similarly, in Davis v. Murrell,93 the defendant established that he
would not have pleaded guilty but for his lawyer's misstatements to him

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 344-45, 627 S.E.2d at 10-11.
Id. at 347-48, 627 S.E.2d at 12.
Id.
279 Ga. 593, 619 S.E.2d 656 (2005).
Id. at 593, 619 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 595, 619 S.E.2d at 658.
Id. at 595-96, 619 S.E.2d at 658-59.
Id. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 658.
280 Ga. 181, 626 S.E.2d 121 (2006).
Id. at 181-82, 626 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 183, 626 S.E.2d at 123.
279 Ga. 584, 619 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
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that he would be eligible for parole in ten years and that he would be
eligible to have his sentence reviewed.94 The habeas court had denied
the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but the supreme
court reversed.95 Finally, the supreme court remanded another case
involving ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty
plea. The habeas court in Harden v.Johnson96 had mistakenly given
weight to the defendant's statements at the time of the plea that he was
satisfied with his counsel's performance. 97 The supreme court held that
such statements were entitled to no weight and remanded the case.98
A final Georgia Supreme Court case during the survey period to allow
a claim of ineffective assistance dealt with a conflict of interest in a
death penalty case. In Howerton v. Danenberg,99 the accused was able
to demonstrate that during the trial of the underlying case, his lawyer
had been simultaneously representing the district attorney in an
unrelated matter. 100 The supreme court concluded that such a conflict
was "completely impermissible."' 0 ' Even without any showing that the
attorney performed deficiently, the court affirmed the part of the habeas
court's order granting relief on the basis of the defense attorney's
impermissible conflict of interest.0 2
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed three cases in which habeas
courts had granted relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
Murrell v.Ricks'0 3 concerned the process by which Mr. Ricks had been
convicted of two counts of molestation of his girlfriend's daughter. The
prosecution used the testimony of a nurse who examined the girl when
she first came forward, which was just over a year after the incidents.
The examination revealed that the girl had a venereal disease. The
prosecution filed a motion in limine before the nurse testified to prevent
mention of that fact based upon the rape shield statute. The trial court
granted the motion. The habeas judge found that Ricks received
ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not contest
receipt of the nurse's evidence, did not ask for a continuance, and did not
argue prejudice.' 0 4 The supreme court reversed.0 5 The court con-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 584-85, 619 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 587, 619 S.E.2d at 664.
280 Ga. 464, 629 S.E.2d 259 (2006).
Id. at 464, 629 S.E.2d at 260.
Id. at 465, 629 S.E.2d at 260.
279 Ga. 861, 621 S.E.2d 738 (2005).
Id. at 862, 621 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 863, 621 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 864, 621 S.E.2d at 741.
280 Ga. 427, 627 S.E.2d 546 (2006).
Id. at 427-28, 627 S.E.2d at 547-48.
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cluded that the rape shield statute made the information about the
venereal disease inadmissible, and therefore counsel could not have been
ineffective just because he did not contest the admissibility of the
inadmissible evidence. 10 6 Furthermore, the court concluded, there was
no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been
different if counsel had secured a continuance to have Ricks tested.0 7
A negative result would not have exonerated him, and a positive result
would have incriminated him. 0 8 Therefore, the habeas court's finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel was reversed.0 9
The court took the same action in State v. Sabillon."° The case bore
a remarkable similarity to Patel in that the defendant's lawyer
misinformed him about the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. In
this case, the collateral consequence was the possibility of deportation."' Unlike Patel, however, Sabillon produced no evidence to the
habeas court that he would not have pleaded guilty (as a first offender,
with four years of probation) rather than go to trial (and risk a long
prison sentence) even if he had known that the plea would subject him
to deportation." 2 In the absence of evidence of harm, the supreme
court unanimously found that his lawyer's actions did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel." 3
The Georgia Supreme Court also reversed the grant of a writ of
habeas corpus in Chatman v. Mancill."4 The underlying problem was
that the defendant's appellate counsel had not secured appellate review
of his case for seven years following the conviction."' The court had
to decide the standard by which it would resolve claims involving
inordinate appellate delay, and it held that the relevant factors to
consider should be (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the
delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his rights to speedy review, and
(4) the prejudice to the defendant. 116 The supreme court applied those
factors to the defendant's situation and concluded that the delays should
be presumed to be the result of strategic choices made by counsel rather

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 427, 627 S.E.2d at 547.
Id. at 429, 627 S.E.2d at 548.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430, 627 S.E.2d at 548.
280 Ga. 1, 622 S.E.2d 846 (2005).
Id. at 2, 622 S.E.2d at 847.
Id. at 3, 622 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 1, 622 S.E.2d at 847.
280 Ga. 253, 626 S.E.2d 102 (2006).
Id. at 253, 626 S.E.2d at 104.
Id. at 256-57, 626 S.E.2d at 107.
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than ineffectiveness... and that, in any event, the defendant was not
harmed by the delay."8
Therefore, the court concluded that the
habeas court should not have granted the writ." 9
One additional case on ineffective assistance reached the court on
direct review. In Dickens v. State, 2 ' the supreme court affirmed the
murder conviction of Latoya Dickens despite her claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, 12' but the opinion provoked a special concurrence
by three justices.'2 2 Dickens admitted that she had stabbed her
husband. She claimed, however, that she did so as a result of battered
woman's syndrome. The jury convicted her, and she claimed that she
received ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer did not
secure the attendance of an out-of-state witness. Supposedly, this
witness could have testified about the victim's abuse of Dickens and
other women in Louisiana. 3
All the justices agreed that her conviction should be affirmed.'2 4 The
split came on the reasoning, particularly about the admissibility of her
trial counsel's testimony of what the absent witness would have
said. 25 The majority held that Ms. Dickens could not rely on counsel's
testimony of what the absent witness would have said to demonstrate
the prejudice that she suffered as a result of counsel's failure to secure
the witness's presence at trial. 126 Instead, she had to have the actual
testimony or an acceptable substitute,'2 7 and the court implied that an
affidavit would have sufficed. 28 The concurring justices disagreed that
anything more than the lawyer's summary of the missing testimony was
needed. 29 They described the summary as a proffer of evidence, which
was not intended to prove the truth of the witness's testimony but
intended only to prove that the lawyer had someone available who would
have testified to particular facts in order to demonstrate how the failure

117. Id. at 257-59, 626 S.E.2d at 108-09.
118. Id. at 263, 626 S.E.2d at 111.
119. Id.
120. 280 Ga. 320, 627 S.E.2d 587 (2006).
121. Id. at 320, 627 S.E.2d at 589.
122. Id. at 325-27, 627 S.E.2d at 592-94 (Benham, Carley, & Hines, JJ., concurring
specially).
123. Dickens, 280 Ga. at 320-21, 627 S.E.2d at 589-90.
124. Id. at 324, 627 S.E.2d at 592.
125. Id. at 325, 627 S.E.2d at 592-93 (Benham, Carley, & Hines, JJ., concurring
specially).
126. Dickens, 280 Ga. at 323, 627 S.E.2d at 591.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 322 n.2, 627 S.E.2d at 590 n.2.
129. Id. at 327, 627 S.E.2d at 594 (Benham, Carley, & Hines, JJ., concurring specially).

250

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

to secure the witness might have affected the outcome of the case. 130
These justices concurred in the result because they did not believe that
the defendant had shown, even with this proffer, that there was a
reasonable probability of a different result if the witness had been
present.131
The court of appeals also had several occasions to grant claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Polk v. State,' the problem was
that the trial counsel had failed to object to an indictment for burglary
that was void because it did not specify a felony that the defendant
intended to commit.1 33 If the lawyer had objected, the defendant could

not have been convicted on that count, at least as drafted, and therefore
Whitaker v. State 31
that part of the conviction was overturned.'
involved a defense lawyer who introduced into evidence records that
showed her client had been previously charged with committing an
identical crime and two closely related crimes.' 36 That incompetence
harmed the defendant because the evidence against him otherwise was
37
less than overwhelming.

In Clue v.State,3 8 the defendant pleaded guilty to six counts as part
of a "package deal" with the prosecution. With respect to the most
serious counts, one through four, the defense lawyer had incorrectly
advised his client about eligibility for parole. The prosecution and the
trial court conceded that the plea as to those counts could be withdrawn
because of ineffective assistance.3 9 The court of appeals held that the
plea to the other two counts also had to fail because all the counts were
related and had been negotiated simultaneously. 40 The court reasoned that the defendant, who likely would have insisted on going to
trial on the more serious charges, probably would not, at the same time,
have pleaded guilty to lesser charges arising from the same facts.'
Finally, the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction in
Stapp v.State'4 ' because the lawyer failed to prepare for trial and

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 326-27, 627 S.E.2d at 593-94.
Id. at 327, 627 S.E.2d at 594.
275 Ga. App. 467, 620 S.E.2d 857 (2005).
Id. at 468, 620 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 469, 620 S.E.2d at 860.
276 Ga. App. 226, 622 S.E.2d 916 (2005).
Id. at 226, 622 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 229, 622 S.E.2d at 919.
273 Ga. App. 672, 615 S.E.2d 800 (2005).
Id. at 672-73, 615 S.E.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 674-75, 615 S.E.2d at 803.
Id. at 675, 615 S.E.2d at 803.
273 Ga. App. 899, 616 S.E.2d 215 (2005).
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failed to request certain jury instructions. 1 3 By his own admission,
the defense lawyer did nothing to prepare other than talk to the two
defendants. He filed no pretrial motions and did not otherwise seek
discovery from the State.144 Furthermore, he did not seek jury charges
on self-defense or accident, all to the detriment of his client, even though
he had strong facts to support the defenses.' 45
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND LIENS
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided several cases during the survey
period related to attorney fees and liens. Two of the cases concern the
effect of attorney misconduct on the right to be paid. In Townsend v.
Lipman,"' an attorney was seeking compensation under a fee contract
after the client fired him. The contract provided that if the client fired
him, he would be paid the greater of: (1) the quantum meruit value of
his services or (2) forty percent of any settlement offer made by the
defendant. The lawyer claimed a settlement offer of $100,000 had been
made, and he sought a fee of $40,000.147 The court of appeals reversed
summary judgment for the lawyer because it determined that there was
14
an issue of fact whether the settlement offer had in fact been made.
More interestingly, the court raised the possibility that the lawyer may
have forfeited the right to compensation if he did not report the offer to
his client as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct. 149 The
court noted that a failure by a lawyer to perform his or her obligations
under a contract may excuse performance (payment) by the client, and
it held that conveyance of settlement offers was an implied term of this
fee contract.5 0 If that is so, one must wonder whether other obligations owed by a lawyer to a client under the Rules of Professional
Conduct may be treated as implied terms of fees contracts, the violation
of which may result in forfeiture of fees.
A case that seems to go the other way, or at least impose another
requirement, is Lewis v. Smith.'' In that case, the lawyer allegedly
settled a case without the client's authorization, which would be a

143. Id. at 899, 616 S.E.2d at 216.
144. Id. at 901-02, 616 S.E.2d at 217-18.
145. Id. at 902, 616 S.E.2d at 218.
146. 277 Ga. App. 326, 626 S.E.2d 538 (2006).
147. Id. at 326-27, 626 S.E.2d at 539.
148. Id. at 327 n.1, 626 S.E.2d at 539 n.1.
149. Id. at 327-28, 626 S.E.2d at 540; see GA. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt.
1A (2000).
150. Townsend, 277 Ga. App. at 327-28, 626 S.E.2d at 539-40.
151. 274 Ga. App. 528, 618 S.E.2d 32 (2005).
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violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a).152 The lawyer
successfully defeated a motion to enforce the settlement, however, and
the case proceeded although the client fired the lawyer. The lawyer
sued, seeking his forty percent of the rejected settlement offer or, in the
alternative, the quantum meruit value of his services. 153 The court
rejected the claim for the contingent fee by noting that the contingency-final recovery by the client-never occurred.M The court, however, rejected the argument that the lawyer's right to a fee may have been
defeated by his misconduct in accepting the settlement without the
client's permission because that action did not harm the client (since the
settlement was not enforced).' 5 5 That holding appears to potentially
conflict with Townsend, where a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct was treated as a defense to a claim for fees. 56 The holding
in Lewis also conflicts with other authority that would seem to permit
forfeiture for lawyer misconduct even when the client is not harmed, at
least if the misconduct occurs in the same matter for which the lawyer
claims a fee.' 57
The court of appeals also decided two cases during the survey period
relating to collection of fees from other lawyers involved in the case. In
King v. Lessinger,"' two lawyers were hired on a contingent fee basis
in a personal injury case. The clients fired those lawyers and hired
successor counsel, who negotiated a settlement for the clients and
collected a one-third contingent fee of over $330,000.19 The first set
of lawyers failed to take the necessary steps to enforce their charging
lien to collect the quantum meruit value of their services. 6 0 Instead,
they sought to collect that money not only from their former clients but
also from successor counsel on the theory that the second set of lawyers
161
should be forced to "disgorge" some of their fee to the first lawyers.

152. Id. at 529-30, 618 S.E.2d at 34; GA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2000).
153. Lewis, 274 Ga. App. at 529, 618 S.E.2d at 34.
154. Id. at 530, 618 S.E.2d at 34.
155. Id. at 531, 618 S.E.2d at 35.
156. Townsend, 277 Ga. App. at 327-28, 626 S.E.2d at 540.
157. See Bryan v. Granade, 257 Ga. 219, 221, 357 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1987) (holding that
an attorney does not have to forfeit fees earned in contingent fee case, despite his later
violations of his professional duties, because the two representations were severable); see
also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that forfeiture of fees
is an appropriate remedy for a conflict of interest even if the client is not harmed).
158. 276 Ga. App. 145, 622 S.E.2d 381 (2006).
159. Id. at 145, 622 S.E.2d at 382-83.
160. Id. at 145 n.1, 622 S.E.2d at 383 n.1.
161. Id. at 145, 622 S.E.2d at 383.
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The court of appeals rejected that argument and affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the claim against the second set of lawyers.'6 2
The court faced a slightly different situation in Kirschner & Venker,
P.C. v. Taylor & Martino, PC.'3 Two firms were co-counsel in a
personal injury case, but they had no agreement about how they would
split any fee. The client fired the Kirschner & Venker firm ("KV"), and
the Taylor & Martino firm ("TM") proceeded to settle the case and
receive a $1.5 million fee. KV sought to split the fee evenly,' which
would have been the result under established precedent if the firms had
both still been working on the case when it ended (because there was no
agreement to the contrary on how to split the fee).' 65 The court held,
however, that the most KV could recover was the reasonable value of its
services, because KV had been fired before the contingent fee was
earned.'66 That was the bad news for KV, but there was some good
news. The court held that KV's claim for fees could be enforced against
its former co-counsel, TM.'6 7 The court distinguished King v. Lessinger
by noting that the lawyers in King had been
successor counsel, and in
168
this case KV and TM had been co-counsel.
One final noteworthy case on fees and liens from the survey period is
Howe & Associates v. Daniels.'69 Attorney Daniels had a contingent
fee contract with the Taylors. When the Taylors fired Daniels and hired
Howe & Associates ("Howe") to handle their case, Daniels took all the
proper steps to enforce his charging lien on the suit. When the Taylors
reached an agreement with the defendants to settle their case, however,
the Taylors voluntarily dismissed their case and then argued that
Daniels lost any right to enforce his charging lien upon dismissal.
Daniels persuaded the trial court to vacate the dismissal of the case and
enforce his lien (for fees measured by quantum meruit and not his
contingent fee contract) against the Taylors, against the original
defendant in the action and against Howe. 7 ° The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the lien prevented the Taylors from filing an
effective dismissal of the action, which authorized the trial court to
vacate the dismissal to preserve and enforce the lien.' 7 '

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 148-49, 622 S.E.2d at 385.
277 Ga. App. 512, 627 S.E.2d 112 (2006).
Id. at 512-13, 627 S.E.2d at 112-13.
Id. at 513-14, 627 S.E.2d at 113.
Id. at 513, 627 S.E.2d at 113.
Id. at 514, 627 S.E.2d at 113.
Id. at 514 n.1, 627 S.E.2d at 113 n.1.
274 Ga. App. 312, 618 S.E.2d 42 (2005), affd, 280 Ga. 803, 631 S.E.2d 356 (2006).
Id. at 313, 618 S.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 315, 618 S.E.2d at 45.
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CONTEMPT

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two cases involving criminal
contempt charges against attorneys. In re Otuonye72 involved an
attorney's failure to appear for a calendar call in the Henry County State
Court. The lawyer had been assigned to represent two indigent
defendants and did not file a conflict letter with the court. The court
appointed new counsel for the defendants, and Otuonye showed up in
court ninety minutes after the calendar call began. He told the court
that he had tried to call the court but had received a recording that the
telephone number had been disconnected. When Otuonye learned that
his clients had new lawyers, he asked for permission to bill the county
for the time he had spent on their cases. The court refused and in effect
found Otuonye in criminal contempt and summarily fined him an
amount equal to the fees he otherwise would have earned for those
defendants.1 73 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial
judge was authorized to find that Otuonye's absence was in willful
disregard of the court's command to appear for the calendar
call and
1 74
that it interfered with the orderly administration of justice.
The court of appeals overturned an order finding an attorney in
criminal contempt in In re Schoolcraft.'75 The attorney, Stanley W.
Schoolcraft, III, represented a defendant who faced charges arising from
the robbery and beating of a pizza delivery man who was beaten in the
head with a pipe. The warrant for Schoolcraft's client stated that the
client, Mackell Ware, was the one who inflicted this injury. Schoolcraft
stated to the court at a bond hearing that Ware did not hit the victim
over the head, but the court denied bond anyway. In a later proceeding
about this incident in juvenile court, Ware admitted hitting the victim
in the back with the pipe, but the evidence showed that others inflicted
the head injuries. When the superior court held a second bond hearing,
the judge asked Schoolcraft whether Ware had been identified at the
juvenile court hearing as the individual who wielded the pipe.'76
Schoolcraft responded, "'It was not my client.'"' 7 Bond was granted,
but the judge later learned that the juvenile court testimony was that
Ware had in fact hit the victim with the pipe. The court convened
another hearing, at which Schoolcraft apologized for misleading the court

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

279 Ga. App. 468, 631 S.E.2d 500 (2006).
Id. at 468-69, 631 S.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 470-71, 631 S.E.2d at 503.
274 Ga. App. 271, 617 S.E.2d 241 (2005).
Id. at 271-72, 617 S.E.2d at 242-43.
Id. at 272, 617 S.E.2d at 243.
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and maintained that he had done so inadvertently. Schoolcraft claimed
that he thought the court had asked whether Ware was the one who
inflicted the severe injuries on the victim. The court held Schoolcraft in
contempt and sentenced him to forty-eight hours in jail and forty hours
of community service. The court also 1removed
Schoolcraft from the
78
appointed counsel list for eight months.
The court of appeals reversed because the trial judge should have
brought in another judge to hear the matter. 179 Although judges have
the power to punish contempt summarily, in this case the court held a
hearing at a later date, after the court learned of the discrepancy
between the juvenile court testimony and Schoolcraft's representation to
the .court. 80 Under those circumstances, a new judge should have
been brought in.' 8' The court of appeals rejected two other arguments
made by Schoolcraft, however.'82 The first was that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of contempt. 183 The court of
appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence for that question to
go to a new factfinder on remand.8
Second, the court held that a
judge's power to punish contempt is not limited to statutory remedies.'85 The trial court possesses inherent power to prescribe how the
court's business is to be conducted, and thus the court had the power to
remove Schoolcraft from the appointed counsel list86 even though the
statute does not list that as a remedy for contempt.
VI.

DISQUALIFICATION

The Georgia appellate courts issued several significant opinions on
attorney disqualification during the survey period. In Bernocchi v.
Forcucci,8 7 the trial court disqualified a law firm from representing codefendants when the plaintiff claimed that the co-defendants had
conflicting interests. The defendants were an individual and two
corporations in which the individual owned shares. 88 In Reese v.
Georgia Power Co.,' 89 a 1989 case, the Georgia Court of Appeals had

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 272-73, 617 S.E.2d at 242-43.
Id. at 273-74, 617 S.E.2d at 243-44.
Id. at 274, 617 S.E.2d at 244.
Id.
Id. at 274-76, 617 S.E.2d at 244-45.
Id. at 274, 617 S.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 275, 617 S.E.2d at 245.
Id. at 275-76, 617 S.E.2d at 245; see O.C.GA. 15-6-8 (2005).
Schoolcraft, 274 Ga. App. at 276, 617 S.E.2d at 245.
279 Ga. 460, 614 S.E.2d 775 (2005).
Id. at 460, 614 S.E.2d at 776-77.
191 Ga. App. 125, 381 S.E.2d 110 (1989).
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held that a litigant does not have standing to seek disqualification of an
opposing lawyer unless the opposing lawyer has been the attorney for
that litigant.190 Since that decision, however, Georgia has adopted its
Rules of Professional Conduct. Comment 15 to Rule 1.7 on concurrent
conflicts of interest contains the following guidance:
Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility
of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court
may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer
has neglected the responsibility .... Where the conflict is such as
clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of
justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an
objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused
as a technique of harassment.' 9 '
In Bernocchi the Georgia Supreme Court remanded with instructions to
the trial court to assess the disqualification motion with this standard
in mind. 192 In other words, it will no longer be enough simply to say
that the moving party does not have, and never had, an attorney-client
relationship with the lawyer whose disqualification is sought. The
relevant standard will be whether the conflict, if any, calls into question
"the fair or efficient administration of justice." 93
The Georgia Court of Appeals dealt with two cases involving disqualification of counsel. In the first, Duvall v. Bledsoe,'94 a lawyer represented a doctor in a divorce and helped the doctor create trusts for his
children. The lawyer left his firm and joined another, which some time
later filed suit against the doctor for a client who alleged medical
malpractice. The doctor sought to disqualify the firm because of the
lawyer's prior representation.1 95 Because the doctor was this lawyer's
former client, the court began with the question whether the second
representation was in the "same or a substantially related matter." 96
It clearly was not the same matter, so the important question was
The court of
whether the matter was "substantially related."'9 7
appeals concluded that it was not. 9 ' The only relevant information

190.
191.
192.
193.
(2000)).
194.
195.
196.
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198.

Id. at 126-27, 381 S.E.2d at 111.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 15 (2000).
Bernocchi, 279 Ga. at 463-64, 614 S.E.2d at 778-79.
Id. at 463, 614 S.E.2d at 778 (citing GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 15
274 Ga. App. 256, 617 S.E.2d 601 (2005).
Id. at 256-57, 617 S.E.2d 603-04.
Id. at 258, 617 S.E.2d 604; see GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2000).
Duvall, 274 Ga. App. at 258-59, 617 S.E.2d 604-05.
Id. at 259, 617 S.E.2d at 605.
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that the lawyer had about his former client was financial information,
and the court believed that this was too tenuous a relationship between
the two matters.199 The court also took comfort in the fact that under
Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(c), the lawyer was bound (on
pain of disbarment) from divulging the confidential information of his
former client, the doctor.2 °0
Finally, in Clough v. Richelo,2 ° ' the Georgia Court of Appeals
interpreted Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7202 for the first
time. 0 3 That rule provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called2 as a witness unless precluded
from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 1,
Thomas Richelo represented Walter Clough and an entity ("CMS") owned
by Clough's wife in a lawsuit (the so-called "Main Line suit"). Clough's
wife sought a divorce from him, which created a conflict of interest for
Richelo. Clough decided to hire another attorney, Merolla, to represent
him in the Main Line suit. Richelo resisted giving Merolla the files on
the Main Line suit, and Clough had to file a motion to compel the return
of the files, which was granted.0 5
Clough eventually sued Richelo for malpractice and related claims
arising from Richelo's representation of Clough in the Main Line suit.
Merolla represented Clough in the malpractice action. Richelo sought
to disqualify Merolla from representing Clough in the malpractice action
because Merolla would be a necessary witness. 2 6
In particular,

199. Id.
200. Id. at 259-60, 617 S.E.2d at 605; see GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt.
9 ("Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional
association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client
formerly represented.").
201. 274 Ga. App. 129, 616 S.E.2d 888 (2005).
202. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2000).
203. Clough, 274 Ga. App. at 132 n.3, 616 S.E.2d at 892 n.3.
204. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7.
205. Clough, 274 Ga. App. at 130, 616 S.E.2d at 890.
206. Id. at 131, 616 S.E.2d at 891.
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Richelo claimed that Merolla would be a witness concerning Richelo's
unsuccessful efforts to act as an intermediary between Clough and his
wife, after which (according to Clough's claims) Richelo was obligated to
withdraw as counsel for all parties, not just for Clough. °7 Also,
Richelo claimed that Merolla would be a necessary witness regarding
Clough's claims that Richelo harmed Clough by refusing to turn over his
files on the Main Line suit.2" 8 Finally, Richelo argued he would be
using Merolla's deposition testimony to demonstrate that any harm
Clough suffered was a result of Clough's own decisions in the Main Line
suit after Merolla became Clough's counsel. The deposition had not been
taken, but Richelo argued such testimony could create a conflict of
interest between Clough and Merolla." 9 The trial court granted the
motion to disqualify.210
The court of appeals reversed.2 1' The court first recognized that no
Georgia appellate case had interpreted what it means to be a "necessary
witness" under Rule 3.7.212 The court then held that Merolla was not

a necessary witness to Richelo's failure to withdraw or to Richelo's
refusal to turn over the files because there were other sources of
evidence in the record about those events.2 13 As to the possibility that
Merolla's deposition testimony would create a conflict of interest between
Merolla and Clough, the court concluded that this claim was too
speculative to warrant disqualification. 214 The court did note, however,
that this conclusion could change once the deposition was taken.215
The court also disposed of one argument about disqualification under
Rule 3.7.216 Because the primary purpose of the rule is to prevent
juror confusion about the role of the lawyer as advocate and the lawyer
as witness, the rule does not require disqualification from pretrial
activities even when the lawyer will be disqualified at trial.217

207. Id. at 133-34, 616 S.E.2d at 892-93.
208. Id. at 134-35, 616 S.E.2d at 893.
209. Id. at 135-36, 616 S.E.2d at 893-94.
210. Id. at 131, 616 S.E.2d at 891.
211. Id. at 139, 616 S.E.2d at 896.
212. Id. at 132 n.3, 616 S.E.2d at 892 n.3.
213. Id. at 133-35, 616 S.E.2d 892-93.
214. Id. at 135-36, 616 S.E.2d 893-94.
215. Id. at 136, 136 n.9, 616 S.E.2d at 894, 894 n.9. The opinion concludes that Richelo
would not have standing to seek disqualification if a conflict occurred, but Merolla would
be obligated to withdraw on his own. Id. at 138, 138 n.10, 616 S.E.2d at 895, 895 n.10.
The conclusion that Richelo would not have standing to seek disqualification is cast into
doubt by the holding of Bernocchi, discussed above, an opinion that had been issued just
days before the opinion in Clough.
216. Id. at 137, 616 S.E.2d at 894.
217. Id. at 137-38, 616 S.E.2d at 894-95.
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MALPRACTICE AND OTHER CLAIMS AGAINST LAWYERS

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided three noteworthy cases
involving malpractice and similar claims against attorneys during the
survey period.2 18 All three arrived at the appellate court after proceedings on motions for summary judgment or for partial summary
judgment.
Both v. Frantz2 19 involved a law firm's representation of various
family members who were fighting over large sums of money. Louise
and Karl Both were married in 1935 and accumulated significant wealth
in the United States and in Switzerland, where they lived. They had
two children, Richard Both and Martha Gray. Lawyer William Frantz
represented Louise and Karl beginning in the 1970s. In the mid-1990s,
Karl Both's health declined, and the family feud over money began.
Karl and the daughter, Martha, were allied against Louise and the son,
Richard. Both sides transferred assets, and Louise and Karl each
changed their wills. Both sides contacted Frantz about various issues
during this time period.220
In 1997 Louise began divorce proceedings. Meanwhile, Frantz or his
firm formed a limited partnership and helped transfer some real estate
acquired during the marriage into the partnership. The partners were
Karl and Martha. Louise sued Frantz and the firm, alleging that Frantz
was still her lawyer when he took these actions and asserting claims for
legal malpractice, fraud, fraudulent conveyance, conversion, and civil
conspiracy.22' The court of appeals had to decide: (1) whether there
was sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment that Frantz or his
firm converted any of Louise's property; 222 (2) whether Frantz and the
firm should have been granted summary judgment on Louise's breach of
fiduciary duty claim;22 (3) whether Louise's claims were barred by res
judicata as a result of the divorce action or probate proceedings; 224 (4)
whether the trial court should have granted summary judgment to
Frantz and the firm on the claims of legal malpractice, fraudulent

218.

Another malpractice case during the relevant time period was a routine

application of the statute of limitations. Villani v. Hughes, 279 Ga. App. 618, 631 S.E.2d
709 (2006). Another dealt with construction of a malpractice insurance policy. Fidelity
Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. OHIC Ins. Co., 275 Ga. App. 55, 619 S.E.2d 704 (2005).
219. 278 Ga. App. 556, 629 S.E.2d 427 (2006).
220. Id. at 556, 629 S.E.2d at 429.
221. Id. at 556-57, 629 S.E.2d at 429-30.
222. Id. at 557, 629 S.E.2d at 430.
223. Id. at 559, 629 S.E.2d at 431.
224. Id. at 560, 629 S.E.2d at 431.

260

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

conveyance, and civil conspiracy; 225 and (5) whether the trial court
erred in granting a motion to compel certain documents that Frantz and
the firm deemed to be privileged.226
The court of appeals had little trouble with the conversion and res
judicata arguments. With respect to the conversion claim, Louise could
not show that any of her money went to the law firm (although some of
it appeared to go to people who in turn paid the law firm money).227
Summary judgment on that claim, therefore, was appropriate.2 28
Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel was available to the
defendants because the earlier proceedings had not been adjudicated on
the merits. 229 That left the court to decide the issues relating to
breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, fraudulent conveyance, civil
conspiracy, and privilege.
The survival of the legal malpractice claim raises familiar issues
regarding the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Frantz and
his firm claimed that they never represented her, but there was
circumstantial evidence that they did.230 Frantz referred in one letter
to both Louise and Karl as his clients, and he addressed another letter
to them collectively as "'client.' 231' As late as 1997, Louise sent him
a letter referring to Frantz as the family lawyer, and Frantz did not
correct that understanding.2 32 The court of appeals held that the
existence of the attorney-client relationship was a question of fact.2 3
In case the jury did not conclude there was an ongoing attorney-client
relationship in 1997, when many of the asset transfers took place, the
court also held that Louise should be able to try to prove breach of
fiduciary duties, such as duties of confidentiality and loyalty owed to her
as a former client. 2 4 As to the other claims, the court held that there
were jury questions about the law firm's participation in fraudulent
conveyances of assets by and for Karl and Martha.3 ' It also held that
the possibility of fraud was significant enough to justify the trial court's
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Id. at 561, 629 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 563, 629 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 557-59, 629 S.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 559, 629 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 560, 629 S.E.2d at 431-32.
Id. at 561, 629 S.E.2d at 432.
Id., 629 S.E.2d at 432-33.
Id. at 561-62, 629 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 562, 629 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 559, 629 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 562-63, 629 S.E.2d at 433.
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decision to compel the production of documents that would have been
privileged but for the crime/fraud exception to the privilege.23 6
The second malpractice case related to a bankruptcy proceeding. In
Thornton v. Mankovitch, 237 a corporation, DT&S Enterprises, Inc.
("DT&S"), sued its former lawyers for malpractice in connection with a
claim that the lawyers brought for DT&S against the United States
Postal Service ("USPS"). After the claim was filed, creditors of DT&S
filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The trustee hired
the lawyers pursuing the claim against the USPS to do so on behalf of
the bankruptcy estate. The claim was the sole asset of the corporation.
An agreement was reached to settle the claim, and the trustee obtained
the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement, which paid the
creditors ninety-two percent of their claims. DT&S objected to the
settlement in bankruptcy and then filed a malpractice action against the
lawyers for settling the claim without permission and for an insufficient
amount.238
The court of appeals held that under federal bankruptcy law, DT&S
became defunct because there is no right to a Chapter 7 discharge for
corporations.3 9 Put another way, DT&S ceased to exist as a result of
the bankruptcy proceeding, and the bankruptcy estate became the real
party in interest as to the claim against the USPS. Therefore, DT&S
had no standing to assert any cause of action against the lawyers for
malpractice, and the trial judge should have granted summary judgment
for the defendants.2 °
The third malpractice claim was Studio X, Inc. v. Weener, Mason &
Nathan, LLP.241 The defendant law firm allegedly had been negligent
in drafting an offer that was intended to exercise a right of first refusal
on a piece of real estate, for which a third party had made an offer. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. 24 2 The court
of appeals affirmed and held that even if there had been malpractice, the
plaintiff could not demonstrate any harm. 243 The owner of the property did not accept the third party's offer and withdrew the property from
the market, which it had the right to do even if the offer drafted by the
law firm had been perfect.2 " This holding is in conformity with the

236. Id. at 563-64, 629 S.E.2d at 434.
237. 277 Ga. App. 221, 626 S.E.2d 189 (2006).
238. Id. at 221, 626 S.E.2d at 190-91.
239. Id. at 222, 626 S.E.2d at 191.
240. Id. at 222-23, 626 S.E.2d at 191-92.
241, 276 Ga. App. 652, 624 S.E.2d 157 (2005).
242. Id. at 652-53, 624 S.E.2d at 157-58.
243. Id. at 653-54, 624 S.E.2d at 159.
244. Id. at 654, 624 S.E.2d at 159.
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general rule on attorney malpractice that a plaintiff must show harm in
order to prevail.245
VIII.

JUDICIAL ETHICS

The Georgia appellate courts decided a handful of cases related to
judicial ethics during the survey period. In Whitley v. Schwall,2 the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's denial of a writ of
mandamus. 24 7 The petitioners sought the writ to compel the trial
judge in a medical malpractice action to recuse himself after that judge
had denied a motion to recuse and entered summary judgment for the
opposing parties. 2'
The supreme court held that the denial of the
motion to recuse had been an appealable order, and therefore mandamus
was not available.249
The court reached the merits of a disqualification order in Turner v.
State.25" The trial judge in a murder case had a passing acquaintance
with the defendant and knew the defendant's mother because she had
worked in the courthouse, but the supreme court held that neither of
these facts was enough to call the judge's impartiality into question.25'
Nor was it disqualifying that the judge may have had conversations with
the defendant's mother about the defendant's murder conviction in an
earlier case, because those conversations would not "lead to the
inescapable conclusion that a reasonable person would consider Judge
Bagley to harbor a bias that affects his ability to be impartial."252
The two remaining cases dealt with ex parte contacts. In Fuller v.
253
Fuller,
the trial judge received suggested findings of fact from each
side in a divorce action. The trial court apparently adopted most of the
husband's proposed findings, but the judge called the husband's lawyer
ex parte to have the husband's lawyer revise the proposed findings to
include findings that were more favorable to the wife.2 ' The supreme
court recognized that the contact was a "technical" violation of the
judge's ethical duties but held that the wife had not been harmed
because the changes were to her benefit.2 5 In Pilcher v. Stribling,2 "6
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Id. at 653, 624 S.E.2d at 159.
279 Ga. 726, 620 S.E.2d 827 (2005).
Id. at 726, 620 S.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 726-27, 620 S.E.2d at 827-28.
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280 Ga. 174, 626 S.E.2d 86 (2006).
Id. at 174-76, 626 S.E.2d at 87-88.
Id. at 176, 626 S.E.2d at 88.
279 Ga. 805, 621 S.E.2d 419 (2005).
Id. at 805-06, 621 S.E.2d at 420-21.
Id. at 806, 621 S.E.2d at 421.
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the Georgia Court of Appeals had to decide whether a judge should have
been disqualified because he initiated conversations with the defendant's
employer, the City of Loganville (the "City"), in connection with an ex
parte application for a protective order.2 7 The plaintiffs were also
employees of the City.2 8 The judge explained that the contacts were
made simply to determine the defendant's employment status, so that
the court could fashion a workable protective order if the plaintiffs
prevailed. 2 9 The court of appeals held that these contacts were not a
sufficient reason to believe that the trial judge was biased. 2 0 As a
result, the lower court's denial of the motion to recuse was affirmed.2 6'
IX.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

The Georgia Supreme Court approved an Advisory Opinion of the
Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law in In re UPL
Advisory Opinion 2003-1.262 The question presented was whether a
nonattorney could act as attorney-in-fact for a debtor in negotiations
with a creditor who had filed suit to collect a debt. The usual scenario
would be that the nonattorney would discover the name and address of
a debtor from courthouse records. The debtor would then receive a
solicitation in which the nonattorney would offer to negotiate with the
creditor in exchange for a fee. 28" The supreme court concluded that
these activities did constitute the unauthorized practice of law because
the nonattorney must "exercise legal judgment to assess the validity and
value of a creditor's claim, evaluate procedural and evidentiary issues
which may affect the outcome of the litigation, and advise clients as to
their legal rights and obligations With
regard to the debt and the
2
reasonableness of a settlement offer." 1
X.

ATTORNEY AUTHORITY

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided one case that should be a vivid
reminder about the agency relationship that exists between attorney and
client. In Speed v. Muhanna,265 a lawyer was hired to pursue personal
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injury claims arising from a foot injury that his client sustained at a
Sports Authority store. The lawyer sued Sports Authority and sought
to take the deposition of the doctor who treated the plaintiff.26 6 The
doctor agreed to cooperate only if he received written assurance that
there would not be a medical malpractice claim, and the lawyer sent a
letter to the doctor stating in part that the case "is not a medical
malpractice case and neither now or in the future will you be subject to
any type of malpractice claim."267 The doctor cooperated in giving the
deposition.268
About eighteen months later, the client had hired a new lawyer, who
filed a medical malpractice claim against the doctor. The doctor
successfully contended in the trial court that any medical malpractice
claim had been released by the first attorney's letter. 2 6 9 The court of
appeals agreed:
Under Georgia law an attorney of record has apparent authority to
enter into an agreement on behalf of his client and the agreement is
enforceable against the client by other settling parties. This authority
is determined by the contract between the attorney and the client and
by instructions given the attorney by the client, and in the absence of
express restrictions the authority may be considered plenary by the
court and opposing parties. The authority may be considered plenary
unless it is limited by the client and that limitation is communicated
to opposing parties. Therefore, from the perspective of the opposing
party, in the absence of knowledge of express restrictions on an
attorney's authority, the opposing party may deal with the attorney as
if with the client, and the client will be bound by the acts of his
attorney within the scope of his apparent authority. The client's
remedy, where there have been restrictions not communicated to the
opposing party, is against the attorney who
overstepped the bounds of
270
his agency, not against the third party.

The underlying lesson for the lawyer is in the last sentence. The lawyer
faces potential liability if he exceeds his actual authority. The client will
be looking to the lawyer to make good on any losses that result from the
lawyer's actions that bind a client.

266. Id. at 900, 619 S.E.2d at 326-27.
267. Id., 619 S.E.2d at 327.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 901, 619 S.E.2d at 327.
270. Id. at 902, 619 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting Brumbelow v. N. Propane Gas Co., 251 Ga.
674, 674-75, 308 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1983)).
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265

CONCLUSION

The 2005-2006 survey period contained some new ground for legal
ethics in Georgia and some reminders of familiar lessons that bear
relearning. As always, the recent cases and other developments warrant
attention because of the guidance they offer for lawyers who seek to
conform their conduct to the norms of the profession.

